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ARGUMENT

I.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTIONS AND
THE
ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY WAS
UNCORROBORATED
A.

Introduction

In short, Appellant asserts that Stone was an accomplice to murder so his
testimony must be corroborated. His own testimony established he helped during
the commission of the murder in addition to helping afterwards.
However, even if Stone was not an accomplice to murder, but only an
accomplice to failure to report a death to coroner or law enforcement and
conspiracy to commit that crime, all of his testimony still needs to be
corroborated.
The state provides no authority for its proposition that there must be
perfect parity of crimes between the defendant and accomplice in order to invoke
the accomplice corroboration requirement.

Stone had also been charged with

murder, and it was only his self-serving statement which exculpated himself from
the murder charge while at the same time inculpated Mr. Capone for the murder.
Thus, to not require corroboration on the charge Stone exculpated himself from
would defeat the reason for the accomplice corroboration requirement, to wit,
accomplices lie to get themselves out of trouble and blame others.
There is also no evidence corroborating Stone's story. When his testimony
and his interpretation of the evidence are removed, as they must be, what is left
does not corroborate his story. Further, even assuming arguendo that there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to have found that Rachael was
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dead or even that Mr. Capone killed her, there was zero remaining evidence
upon which the jury could have found that it was murder, much less first degree
murder.

B.

Stone was an accomplice to murder

First, the state argues Stone is not an accomplice to all three crimes so
his testimony related to first degree murder need not be corroborated. In short,
the state is wrong because by his own admission Stone did help while Mr.
Capone was supposedly committing the murder.
Again, the pattern jury instruction defines accomplice as follows:
An accomplice is a person who intends to promote or assist in the
commission of a crime and who either directly commits the acts
constituting the crime or who, before or during its commission, aids,
assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits,
invites, helps or hires another to commit the crime. Mere presence
at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or
commission of a crime is not [in the absence of a duty to act]
sufficient to make one an accomplice.
ICJI 313.
Contrary to the state's argument which simply ignores Stone's own
testimony of what he did to help, Stone was not merely a bystander to the
murder. Stone testified on that Friday evening he heard a loud noise and walked
out of the shop and saw Mr. Capone on top of Rachael strangling her. (Tr. p.
1781.) According to Stone, Rachael was still alive (she was moving a little). (Tr.
p. 1782.) Stone testified Mr. Capone told him to go into the shop and get a tarp.
(Tr. p. 1784.)

Stone testified he went into the shop and found a tarp, but it was

in the loft area which he couldn't reach without a ladder. (Tr. p. 1785.) He went
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back outside and Mr. Capone was still on top of Rachael strangling her, but she
was not moving. (Tr. p. 1787.)

Stone testified that he told Mr. Capone there

were a couple tarps up top and "[w]hat do you want me to do?" Tr. p. 1787, In.
22.
So when Stone first came upon them, Rachael was still alive so ipso facto,
it was during the alleged commission of the murder which had not yet been
completed.

Then, Stone was not merely present or silently consented, he

affirmatively tried to help by going to get a tarp and was only thwarted because
he couldn't get up to the loft. Simply put, he was an accomplice to murder.
More to the point, the state actually charged Stone with first degree
murder and established probable cause for this charge when he was bound over
on it. If the state had not needed Stone's testimony to use against Mr. Capone it
cannot seriously be believed that the state would not be arguing that Stone was
also guilty of murder due to his participation.

C.

Even if Stone was not an accomplice to murder, his testimony still
must be corroborated because it exculpates him of murder and
inculpates Mr. Capone

The state grudgingly admits Stone was an accomplice to the charges of
failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death and conspiracy to commit
failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death. 1 (Respondent's brief, p.
21.) The state then argues since Stone was not an accomplice to murder, that
1 The state also appears to concede that Stone was an accessory after the fact
to murder. (Respondent's brief, p. 15.)
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the corroboration requirement was not applicable to Mr. Capone's murder
charge, but only to the other charges.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Stone was not an accomplice to
the murder itself, this does not mean there is no corroboration requirement when
he blames Mr. Capone for the murder while exculpating himself from it.
The state provides no authority for its proposition that a co-defendant's
testimony can be parsed out between that which concerns like charges with the
defendant and thus must be corroborated and testimony which concerns crimes
of which he was exculpated by his own word and thus need not be corroborated.
This clearly cannot be correct, particularly given that the very reason for the
corroboration requirement is because accomplices lie and blame others to help
themselves. Again, Stone was charged and bound over for murder, and it was
only his statement that removed criminal liability from himself for murder and
placed it solely on Mr. Capone.
Instructive is State v. Emmons, 94 Idaho 605 (1972), where the Idaho
Supreme Court explained the

purpose of the accomplice corroboration

requirement.
The Oregon Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Carr, supra,
wherein a criminal conviction was reversed because it was based
on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, contains a clear
statement of the purpose of a statute such as I. C. § 19-2117:
"* * * This statute [essentially the same as I.C. § 19-2117]
absolutely prohibits a conviction in a criminal case upon the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, even although
[sic] the jury may believe such testimony to be entirely true,
and that it establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
It proceeds upon the theory that
experience in the administration of the criminal law has
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shown the sources of such testimony to be generally so
corrupt as to render it unworthy of belief, and that it is
therefore better as a matter of public policy to forbid a
conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice, although the guilty may thereby sometimes
. escape punishment, than to leave it possible for the
conviction of an innocent person on such testimony.
Whether this rule of law is wise or unwise is not for us to
inquire. It is so written, and must be applied by the court * *
*." 42 P. at 216.

Id. p. 609.
In short, given the purpose of the accomplice corroboration requirement,
which is that accomplices lie to help themselves and do it by placing the blame
on others, Appellant asserts that determining whether one is an accomplice is not
a narrow test focusing solely on whether that person was charged, or remains
charged, with the exact same crimes. Rather, consideration of the accomplice's
participation in the same criminal episode (and his motive to lie about said
participation) is what is important, particularly where the only evidence
exculpating the accomplice from one or more of the charges is his own word.

D.

The murder and

Mr.

Capone's connection to it were not

corroborated
In its brief, Respondent claims "[t]he state presented sufficient evidence to
corroborate Mr. Stone's testimony and establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
essential elements of all of the charged crimes." Respondent's brief p. 12. A
review of what the state claims is corroborating evidence shows it completely and
utterly fails to establish first degree murder.

5

For example, the state points to evidence that suggests that Rachael was
at Mr. Capone's shop that Friday, that she was dead, and that he was upset after
her disappearance. 2
Even assuming arguendo there is sufficient circumstantial evidence for the
jury to find that Rachael is dead, or even that Mr. Capone killed her, there is zero
evidence aside from Stone upon which the jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was murder, much less first degree murder.
The state argues that Tim Fountain witnessed "a confrontation" between
Mr. Capone and a woman outside of his shop. This does not tell the whole story.
Mr. Fountain testified that the woman was confronting Mr. Capone and he was
responding calmly. Specifically, Tim Fountain testified that the Yukon rapidly
approached the shop and slightly skidded to a stop and a woman got out flailing
her arms and hollering at Mr. Capone, but his reaction was very calm. (Tr. p.
1697, 1705.) The woman approached right up into his face shouting at him and
when she would take a breath occasionally he would answer smoothly. (Tr. p.
1697, 1705.) Mr. Fountain testified that Mr. Capone walked back to his shop and
she followed and continued to scold him. (Tr. p. 1705.)
This in itself strongly suggests that even if Mr. Capone did kill Rachael, the
killing would not have constituted first degree murder. Of course, simply killing
someone does not make it murder, it can be self-defense, involuntary
Incidentally, Mr. Capone did not tell Captain Hally that he had been stalking
and harassing Rachael. Captain Hally testified that Mr. Capone told him that he
and Rachael were playing a stupid game and they had made spoof.com calls to
each other. (Tr. p. 1185-7.) In other words, Captain Hally construed that as
stalking and harassing. Mr. Capone did not literally admit to stalking and
harassing.
2
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manslaughter, or voluntary manslaughter if acting under the heat of passion or
sudden quarrel. But even if it is murder, there is no corroborating evidence it
was a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. In short, Stone provided the
only evidence that could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Capone
killed Rachael, that it was murder, and that it was first degree murder.

E.

There was no corroborating evidence connecting Mr. Capone to the
crimes of failure to report a death and conspiracy to do so

The state concedes that Stone was an accomplice to the crimes of failure
to notify coroner or law enforcement of death and conspiracy to commit that
offense, but then argues that there was evidence corroborating Stone's testimony
that Mr. Capone had committed those offenses as well.
The problem with the state's argument is that it does not actually remove
Stone's testimony from the mix when determining whether it was corroborated.
The relevant pattern jury instruction provides as follows:
Corroborative evidence is evidence of some act or fact related to
the offense which, if believed, by itself and without any aid,
interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense
charged.
However, it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be
sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged,
or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies.
In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you
must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been
removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is
any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense.
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If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect
defendant with the commission of the offense, the testimony of the
accomplice is not corroborated.
If there is such independent evidence which you believe, then the
testimony of the accomplice is corroborated.
ICJI 314 (emphasis added).
A few easy examples of the flaw in the state's argument are shown by the
following passage from the state's brief where the (underlined) testimony of
Stone must be removed to determine whether the remaining evidence connects
the defendant to the offense:
Mr. Stone also testified that Capone instructed him to get a chain.
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1801, L. 23 - p. 1803, L. 17.) Mr. Stone went to his
place of work, the City of Moscow, and got a long chain from a
scrap iron pile. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1806, L. 8 - p. 1816, L. 13; Exs. 121 124, 139.) Capone and Mr. Stone used that chain to help wrap
Rachael's body in the tarp. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 - p. 1821, L.
§j
Rick Benjamin, a fleet supervisor with the City of Moscow, testified
the city has a scrap iron pile where old tire chains are placed, and
they do not take inventory of that scrap iron. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2115,
L. 14 -p. 2117, L. 5.)
The day after the murder, Mr. Stone and Capone met at Shari's
restaurant. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1838, L. 9 - p. 1840, L. 2.) During this
meal Capone reminded Mr. Stone to keep his mouth shut about
Rachael's death. (Id.) The state introduced into evidence a receipt
showing that Mr. Stone paid for breakfast at Shari's Restaurant at
11:11 a.m. Saturday, April 17, 2010. (Ex. 150.)
Respondent's brief, p. 24 (emphasis added).
Obviously, when Stone's aid, interpretation or direction is removed, the
remaining evidence is innocuous like the city has scrap chains or Stone had
breakfast, neither one of which suggests, much less establishes, that a crime
occurred or that Mr. Capone committed it.
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II.

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT FOR ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY
First,

the

state

argues

that

since

the

accomplice

corroboration

requirement is statutory, it cannot be the basis for fundamental error.

While

Idaho has enacted a special statute regarding accomplice testimony, its very
purpose is to ensure that all elements of the crime are found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, it is Mr. Capone's due process rights which are violated
by the failure to instruct the jury as to the corroboration requirement. See, In Re:

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

In other words, since Mr. Capone's convictions

could only be based on Stone's uncorroborated testimony, they were not based
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, the state claims that the error was not clear from the record
because it was not clear that Stone was an accomplice or that counsel's failure to
request an accomplice corroboration instruction was not a tactical decision. Both
are red herrings.
As discussed above, it is clear that Stone was an accomplice and the
state's novel idea that he is not is what is far from clear.

As to the failure to

request the accomplice corroboration instruction, the state argues that counsel
may have not requested it because the defense was that Stone was lying and no
crime had been committed. This is absurd. An instruction to the jury specifically
instructing it to remove Stone's testimony and look for independent corroborating
evidence is perfectly consistent with the defense theory that Stone was lying and
no crime was committed, not somehow inconsistent with it.
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However, it does not even matter if defense counsel intentionally did not
want that instruction. If that was the case, it was not an unreviewable legitimate
tactical decision, but rather was based on a misunderstanding of the law because
the failure to instruct the jury of the corroboration requirement made it easier for
Mr. Capone to be convicted.
Finally, the state argues there is sufficient corroboration and any error was
harmless. For all the reasons discussed in Appellant's opening brief and above,
this is not correct.

Ill.

THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING I.RE. 404(b) EVIDENCE
A.

The

evidence

of Mr.

Capone's

federal

firearms

arrest

is

inadmissible I.RE. 404(b) evidence
The state is wrong about the court's ruling on the May 6, 2010, arrest. At a
motion hearing on April 9, 2014, the state argued the evidence that Mr. Capone
was arrested on May 6, 2010, was relevant because it was contextual as to why
Mr. Capone was taken down to the police department and why there were
federal agents there when he made a statement. (Tr. 4/19/2014, p. 56.)
Since the court suppressed the statements from May 6, 2010, there could
be no reason why the jury needed to know that he was arrested on that day since
it was for the federal felon in possession charge which had nothing to do with the
murder charge.
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B.

The state's theory that Mr. Capone was afraid of being turned in for
guns makes no sense and was a pretextual way to introduce his
felon status

Contrary to the state's recharacterization of Appellant's argument, he is
not asserting that the court must find sufficient evidence of the motive for the
murder. Rather, Appellant is arguing that the state's ostensible motive for the
murder, to wit, that Mr. Capone was afraid Rachael might turn him in because he
had a gun, made no sense under the circumstances of the case (and was also
unsupported). Thus, evidence of his felon status was not relevant, in that it could
not make any fact of consequence any more or less likely. Rather, the state's
theory was merely a pretext in which to place bad character evidence before the
jury.
The state did not argue below, as it does for the first time on appeal, that
evidence of his arrest for possession of a gun was admissible because it
concerned his legal problems regarding guns. Instead, the state argued only that
it offered context to his statements which were then suppressed, and expressly
stated that it would not be eliciting testimony about the underlying gun charges
from the witnesses (but an inmate nevertheless testified to this).

Further,

Rachael did not turn him in because of guns so there was absolutely no
connection between that arrest and the instant crime.
While the fact that Mr. Capone was incarcerated may well have been
relevant because of the jailhouse snitches,

11

the reason for it (felon in possession

of a firearm) was not. As argued by defense counsel, the jury would just assume
he was incarcerated on the murder charge.

C.

The alleged prior act of violence was inadmissible I.RE. 404(b)
evidence

As to evidence of Mr. Capone's alleged prior act of violence against
Rachael (attempted strangulation}, again, the court did not perform the two tier
I.RE. 404(b) analysis including whether there was sufficient proof that a prior act

of violence even occurred.

The charges were dismissed and even the state

admits that Mr. Capone stated repeatedly that there was no physical altercation,
but instead there was an accident.
The state next argues that the I.RE. 404(b) evidence of the physical
altercation was relevant to provide context to the supposed admissions made by
Mr. Capone that Rachael was not coming back to testify against him in the
attempted strangulation case. This is circular, the state is arguing that I.RE.
404(b) evidence is admissible to provide context for the I.RE. 404(b) evidence.
The state also argues another ostensible grounds for its admission, that it
is relevant to motive.

The state argues that the physical altercation is what

caused their separation and without the separation, Rachael would not have
been at Mr. Capone's shop on the day in question. This is not motive, but seems
like an attempt at establishing proximate cause. The actual motive according to
the state is Rachael divorcing him, not the remote reason for the divorce.
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IV.

THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW TWO DIFFERENT
STATE'S WITNESSES TO BE IMPEACHED WITH THEIR LESS THAN
10 YEAR OLD BURGLARY CONVICTIONS
The state concedes that burglary and robbery are somewhat less relevant

to credibility than say, purgery.

The state also concedes that I.RE. Rule 609

requires a case by case analysis is required to determine whether burglary is
relevant to credibility.
While detailed in Appellant's opening brief, Appellant will repeat the state's
entire argument from below, which is simply declaring the burglary convictions
are not relevant to credibly with absolutely no reasoning or basis.
As to Voss, the state's entire argument was "[t]he fact that Mr. Voss has a
prior burglary conviction from 2010 is not relevant to his credibility and not
admissible." (R. p. 485.)
The state's entire argument as to Glass was:
The State submits that none of these convictions are relevant to
credibility, and all but the 2006 First Degree Burglary conviction are
more than ten (10) years old. Consequently, evidence of these
convictions is not admissible.
State's Motions in Limine, p. 12. (R. p. 486.)
At the hearing on April 19, 2014, the state's argument about why the
burglary convictions should not be permitted for impeachment was as follows:
Thank you. Your Honor, .... to decide which felonies come in,
obviously there are three different levels of types of crimes that the
Court can consider, whether they're relevant or not. The first would
be perjury. That, of course, is clearly admissible as impeachment
evidence. The next category would be one such as robbery and
burglary, under State vs. Ybarra and State vs. Pierce, and the
State's argument is that a burglary conviction from 2010 does not fit
under the issue of whether the witness is credible or not, and so
feels that it would be barred based on Idaho Rule of Evidence 609.
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Tr. 4/19/2014, p. 11, In. 15-p. 12, In. 1 (emphasis added).
The court's written order on the motions in limine also simply declares the
convictions not relevant with absolutely no reasoning or basis:
The state's motion in limine
or introducing evidence of
conviction for Burglary,
violations) is granted. Such
credibility.

to prohibit the defense from mentioning
Joshua Voss' criminal history (a 2010
misdemeanor theft, and probation
evidence is not relevant to the witness'

The state's motion in limine to prohibit the defense from mentioning
or introducing evidence of Brent Glass' criminal history (a 2006
conviction for Burglary, and 4 other felony convictions that occurred
more than 10 years ago) is granted. Such evidence is not relevant
to the witness' credibility.
Order Re: Motions in Limine, p. 1. (R. p. 1571.)
The district court did not acknowledge Idaho law which holds that burglary
can be relevant to credibility, much less conduct a case by case analysis. The
same is true as to whether the 2002 burglary conviction was too remote or not.
The court simply ignored the provision in I.R.E. 609 providing that the 10 year
limit runs from the conviction or release from custody on the conviction.

V.

THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
To flesh out the facts surrounding this issue, on March 9, 2015, law

enforcement obtained a statement from Tyler Byer, who had been housed in the
same jail cell as David Stone in the Latah County Jail in July of 2013. Tyler Byer
reported that Stone said they would never find the body (Rachael Anderson's) in
the river because it was not there. Mr. Byer was being booked for DUI by a
deputy and was drunk. However, Lieutenant Besst talked to Mr. Byer the next
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day at his place of employment and he confirmed the statement. (Augmentation,
p. 7.)
Back to the point, Stone's statement that Rachael's body was not in the
river was not hearsay because it was an admission of a party opponent. I.RE.
801(d)(2).
The state's own argument shows it is a statement of a co-conspirator.
I.RE. 801(d)(2)(E).

The state points out that in order to be a co-conspirator

statement the declaration must be while the conspiracy is actually in progress
and in furtherance of it.

The state also argues that the statement is not

substantive because when he made it, Stone was still living his lie about his
involvement with Rachael's disappearance. The state opines "[t]his lying would
presumably include lying about Rachael's body not being in the river-especially if
that is where it was." Respondent's brief at p. 54.
To begin with, whether or not a declarant is still lying does not determine
whether a statement is substantive or not. But more to the point, the conspiracy
to not report Rachael's death is a continuing conspiracy which can extend after
arrest.

Under the state's theory, Stone's statement was in furtherance of the

conspiracy because it was made to throw off the discovery of the body by
having the investigation look elsewhere.

While the parties only learned of the

statement after trial, Stone actually made it in July of 2013 prior to even the
preliminary hearing when he was still charged with murder. 3

This is why Stone can be also considered a party and his statement admitted
against him under I.RE. 801 (d)(2)(A).

3
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CONCLUSION
For all these reasons and those in his opening brief, Mr. Capone requests
this Court reverse and vacate his convictions due to insufficient evidence, or in
the alternative, to reverse and vacate his convictions and remand this matter for
a new trial.
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